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Abstract
Central banks use a series of relatively small interest rate changes in adjusting their
monetary policy stance. This persistence in interest rate changes is well documented by
empirical monetary policy reaction functions that feature a large estimated coefficient for
the lagged interest rate. The two hypotheses that explain the size of this large estimated
coefficient are monetary policy inertia and serially correlated macro shocks. In the first
part of my dissertation, I show that the effect of inertia on the Federal Reserve’s monthly
funds rate adjustment is only moderate, and smaller than suggested by previous studies.
In the second part, I present evidence that the temporal aggregation of interest rates puts
an upward bias on the size of the estimated coefficient for the lagged interest rate. The
third part of my dissertation is inspired by recent developments in the housing market and
the resulting effect on the overall economy. In this third essay, we show that high loan-tovalue mortgage borrowing reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy.
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Introduction
Central banks use a series of relatively small interest rate changes in adjusting their
monetary policy stance. This persistence in interest rate changes is well documented by
empirical monetary policy reaction functions that feature a large estimated coefficient for
the lagged interest rate. The two hypotheses that explain the size of this large estimated
coefficient are monetary policy inertia and serially correlated macro shocks.
In the first part of my dissertation, I use an ordered probit-based analysis to show that the
effect of inertia on the Federal Reserve’s monthly funds rate adjustment is only moderate,
and smaller than suggested by previous studies. This finding indicates that the Fed’s
response to serially correlated factors plays an important role in policy setting. These
predictions are in line with the interpretation that inertia and serially correlated shocks
simultaneously affect monetary policy.
In the second part of my dissertation, I present evidence that the temporal aggregation of
interest rates puts an upward bias on the size of the estimated coefficient for the lagged
interest rate. Particularly, measuring the path of monetary policy by averaged interest
rates leads to spuriously large parameter estimates for the lagged interest rate due to
temporal aggregation effects.
The third part of my dissertation is inspired by recent developments in the housing
market and the resulting effect on the overall economy. In this third essay, we use a
simple partial equilibrium consumer theory model to explore the implications of high
loan-to-value mortgage borrowing. We find that sufficiently large expected house price
growth reduces the impact of monetary policy on aggregate demand, and that it leads to
housing demand showing patterns contrary to traditional investment and consumption
theories.

1

Part 1
An Ordered Probit Analysis of Monetary Policy Inertia
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This paper is under review for publication in the Journal of Monetary Economics.

Abstract
The two hypotheses that explain the observed persistence in interest rate changes are
monetary policy inertia and serially correlated macro shocks. In this study, I use an
ordered probit-based analysis to provide evidence that the effect of inertia on the Federal
Reserve’s monthly funds rate adjustment is only moderate. This finding indicates that the
Fed’s response to serially correlated factors plays an important role in policy setting.
These predictions are in line with a recent interpretation that inertia and serially
correlated shocks simultaneously affect monetary policy.
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1. Introduction
The two leading explanations of the observed persistence in short-term policy interest
rate changes are monetary policy inertia and serially correlated macro shocks. In this
paper, I use an ordered probit-based exercise to examine the Federal Reserve’s monthly
funds rate adjustment under the former chairmen Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. The
results show that inertia is present at monthly data, but its impact is not sufficient to
generate the observed path of successive interest rate changes. This in turn suggests that
the central bank’s reaction to serially correlated factors plays an important role in policy
setting. 1
The monetary policy inertia view (also called interest rate smoothing, partial adjustment,
or gradualism) is that the central bank deliberately spreads large interest rate changes
over time. The inertia advocates present several motivations for such gradualism. Among
them, Goodfriend (1991) discusses how reducing the volatility of interest rates and that of
asset prices promote financial stability. Sack (2000) argues that the model and the
parameter uncertainty inherent in macro projections warrant a sequence of small
adjustments. Woodford (2003) shows how interest rate smoothing improves the bank’s
stabilization policy in the presence of forward-looking agents. 2 These theoretical
arguments are supported by estimated monetary policy reaction functions (i.e. regressions
of the interest rate on a small number of macro variables and the lagged interest rate) that
produce evidence of substantial inertia. 3
Rudebusch (2002) challenges the inertia argument by showing that a spurious finding of
inertia might arise when policymakers respond to serially correlated factors that are
omitted in the estimated policy rule. 4 Moreover, Rudebusch (2002), Rudebusch (2006),
and Rudebusch and Wu (2008) present empirical evidence against the inertia hypothesis.
They emphasize that in a highly inertial system, future interest rate changes should be
largely predictable. However, the term structure evidence (built on interest rate forward
and futures data) shows that the accuracy of market forecasts diminishes greatly beyond
the first few months. 5
1

I analyze here the policy adjustment at monthly frequency. Rudebusch (2006) discusses how monthly
policy inertia is independent of whether policymakers smooth interest rates over several quarters.
2
Orphanides and Williams (2005) corroborates further the need for a restrained policy reaction by showing
that activist monetary policy aimed at stabilizing unemployment tightly around a severely underestimated
natural rate of unemployment led to poor macro performance in the late 1960s and 1970s. They argue that
had the policy remained less aggressive the stagflation of the 1970s would have been avoided.
3
The coefficient on the lagged interest rate is around 0.8 at quarterly frequency suggesting a very slow
response to monetary shocks, with only about 20 percent of a desired adjustment achieved after a full
quarter. See Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida et al. (2000), and Sack and Wieland (2000) among others.
4
These omitted serially correlated factors include episodes of financial market distress (Gerlach-Kristen,
2004), time variation in the real equilibrium interest rate (Trehan and Wu, 2007), and persistent gaps
between the real-time data used by policymakers to set the interest rate and finally revised data used by
analysts to estimate the policy rule (Lansing, 2002).
5
On the contrary, Podpiera (2008) points out that the term structure evidence of limited predictable
variability in future interest rates does not necessarily prove that monetary policy is non-inertial. He shows
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A third line of analysis focuses on the possibility that both inertia and serially correlated
factors might affect the policy setting. Using nested empirical structures, English et al.
(2003) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004) present evidence that both mechanisms matter to the
Fed. Carrillo et al. (2007) use a DSGE model combined with a monetary vector
autoregression to show that the observed federal funds rate path is better fitted by a
policy that displays moderate policy inertia and also reacts to serially correlated factors.
The customary central bank practice is to change the policy rate infrequently, and by
discrete amounts. I use an ordered probit in modeling interest rate changes to account for
the discrete and the censored nature of policy adjustment. Several studies consider similar
monetary policy applications of the ordered probit model. Gali et al. (2004), Carstensen
(2006), and Gerlach (2007) examine the interest rate setting decisions by the European
Central Bank, Dueker (1992), Choi (1999), Dueker (1999), and Hamilton and Jorda
(2002) by the Federal Reserve, Eichengreen et al. (1985) and Genberg and Gerlach
(2004) by the Bank of England, and Huang and Lin (2006) by the monetary authority in
Taiwan. Despite the large number of ordered probit applications, no previous study
discusses policy inertia, with the exception of Dueker (1999). 6 The present study enters
that debate proposing a novel ordered probit-based test.
Rudebusch (2006) states that the presence of substantial policy inertia in high frequency
data (i.e. weekly or monthly) is generally acknowledged, and so the investigation of
inertia is mostly limited to quarterly data. The main finding of the present study is that
inertia is not as pronounced at monthly frequency as anecdotal evidence suggests. I
demonstrate below that inertia alone is not sufficient to create the observed persistent
path of monthly interest rate changes, and therefore the Fed’s response to serially
correlated factors must be playing a part in policy setting. This is in line with the
interpretation that inertia and serially correlated shocks simultaneously affect monetary
policy decisions.
The plan of paper is as follows. The second section sets out the structure of the ordered
probit model. In the following section, I describe the data and present the estimation
results. The fourth section describes the application of the ordered probit to measuring the
impact of inertia on monthly funds rate setting. I conclude in the last section.

that even highly inertial policymakers (i.e. Bank Board of the Czech Central Bank) are unable to predict
future policy changes beyond the first two quarters, let alone market participants who tend to align their
expectations with the declared policy outlook of the central bank.
6
Dueker (1999) finds evidence of inertia in funds rate setting by choosing a proper normalization for the
standard deviation of model errors, which makes the ordered probit thresholds directly comparable in size
to actual funds rate changes.
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2. Model
I use an ordered probit to model the Federal Reserve’s monthly funds rate changes. 7 The
organizing principle of the model is an extended Taylor-type rule, following Taylor
(1993). 8 In the ordered probit model, ΔFFRt* denotes the unobserved continuous
dependent variable, the desired federal funds rate change, measuring the distance
between the current desired rate and the lagged actual rate (i.e. FFRt* - FFRt-1). The
desired rate change satisfies 9:

where πt-1 is the lagged inflation, Δπt-1 is the lagged change in inflation, yt-1 is the lagged
output gap, that is, the percentage deviation of output from its potential, Δyt-1 is the
lagged change in the output gap, FFRt-1 is the lagged federal funds rate, ΔFFRt-1 is the
lagged change in the federal funds rate, and εt is a stochastic error term that captures the
uncertainty in policy effects and specification error. 10
The federal funds rate changes are typically announced at the end of the Federal Open
Market Committee meetings that take place eight times a year, roughly every six weeks.
This institutional arrangement raises the possibility of serial correlation at the first two
lags in monthly estimation depending on the timing of meetings. So, I add to the model
ΔFFRt-2, the second lag of the dependent variable.
The latent regression model in expression (1) underlies the maximum likelihood
estimation. The conditional mean of the dependent variable ΔFFRt* is a linear function of

7

Parameter stability across monetary regimes is a recurrent issue for empirical reaction functions usually
preventing the use of long samples. With the fairly short samples available, a quarterly ordered probit
model lacks the sufficient number of observations in different interest rate change categories necessary for
estimation. Thus, the selection of the ordered probit leads naturally to a monthly analysis.
8
Simple Taylor rules that assign positive weights on inflation and output targets are a common way of
describing monetary policy on theoretical (Svensson, 1997) and empirical grounds (Judd and Rudebusch,
1998).
9
The selection of inflation and output gap as the determinants of policy is consistent with the literature.
Since the observed dependent variable is the change in the federal funds rate, I add to the model the
changes in these variables. See Choi (1999) and Dueker (2000) for similar applications.
10
One weakness of this fairly standard probit structure is that the unobserved model errors might be serially
correlated if one fails to include all the relevant conditioning variables. A dynamic ordered probit
specification is one way to deal with serial correlation at the expense of undertaking complicated numerical
integrations (Eichengreen et al, 1985). However, the evidence presented below for residual serial
independence warrants the use of the simpler model.
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observed and unobserved factors, where the distribution of the latter is assumed to be
normal with zero mean and unit variance. 11
The policy rule is backward-looking in that the monetary authority is assumed to respond
to the lagged values of inflation and output gap rather than to forecasts. 12 The adjustment
of the current desired change ΔFFRt* depends on past actual rates (FFRt-1, ΔFFRt-1, and
ΔFFRt-2) rather than past desired rates, as proposed by Dueker (2000).
The central bank raises the federal funds rate in response to rising inflation and excessive
output expansions. Then, the expected signs for inflation and output gap variables are
positive. Provided that expression (1) is a simplified unrestricted error correction model,
the expected signs on the lagged funds rate changes are positive and that on the lagged
funds rate is negative.
The ordered probit maps the unobserved desired funds rate change (ΔFFRt*) onto the
observed discrete funds rate change (ΔFFRt) through estimated thresholds. The
continuous domain of ΔFFRt* is divided into five regions, one for each interest rate
change category observed in the sample, through six thresholds such that the first and last
thresholds are τ0 = - ∞ and τ5 = + ∞ and τk+1 > τk for all k. The measurement model for the
observed dependent variable can be formally written as:
(2)

when

where the actual rate change falls in category k = 1 … 5 when ΔFFRt* lies between τk-1
and τk. 13
The probability that the observed change in the policy rate falls into the kth category
(ΔFFRt = k) is:
(3)
where

is the cumulative standard normal density function.

The probabilities in expression (3) combine for each observation to maximize the
following log-likelihood function:
(4)
where D(ΔFFRt = k) is a dummy variable that equals one if ΔFFRt = k in period t and
zero otherwise.
11

See Choi (1999) for a discussion on the normality of errors.
For similar applications, see Dueker (1999), Choi (1999), and Carstensen (2006).
13
Expression (2) reflects that interest rate changes occur infrequently with a threshold effect, signaling the
Fed’s willingness to allow deviations from the desired level in a certain tolerance range. This range might
arise, for instance, from the recognition that staff projections are sensitive to data and model uncertainty.
12
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3. Estimation
3.1 Data
I use seasonally adjusted monthly data for monetary policy under the chairmen Alan
Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. 14 The sample period starts in October 1989, roughly two
years after Greenspan’s appointment because there were target funds rate changes of
smaller than 25 basis points prior to that date, and ends in December 2007. I control for a
possible shift in policy across the two chairmen by extending the model with an indicator
variable for the latter period and the necessary interaction terms. The relevant results are
presented below.
The federal funds rate series is available daily. I consider the observed interest rate
change from the last business day of the month to that of the previous month, aggregating
multiple rate changes in a single month into a larger interest rate change. 15 For the sample
period 10/89 through 12/07, the Fed adjusted the federal funds rate 73 times (that is, the
funds rate was cut 14 times by 50 basis points, 27 times by 25 basis points, and raised 27
times by 25 basis points, 5 times by 50 basis points) leaving it unchanged 145 times. 16
I use a core-type inflation measure that equals the percentage growth in monthly personal
consumption expenditures price index excluding food and energy prices in excess of an
inflation target of 2 percent. This is in line with the original Taylor rule. Exclusion of
food and energy price series serves the purpose of smoothing out temporary price
fluctuations in the economy.
The monthly output gap is approximated by the percentage deviation of industrial
production (IP) from its long-run trend. I run the monthly IP data through a HodrickPrescott filter and receive the short-run cyclical component by subtracting the long-run
trend from actual IP. Accordingly, a positive output gap corresponds to an overheated
economy.
3.2 Estimation Results
Although Taylor-type rules present a fairly accurate account of past monetary behavior
and serve as an informal benchmark for future policy, some flexibility is required in their
interpretation. For instance, deviations in the interest rate from the rule-recommended
14

I use finally revised data rather than real-time data as advocated by Orphanides (2001).
For instance, I sum up two separate 25 basis point cuts on 12/7/90 and on 12/18/90 to a 50 basis point
decrease in December 1990.
16
There are three exceptions to this categorization: I set the 75 basis point cut in December 1991 to be a 50
basis point decrease in December of 1991 and a 25 basis point decrease in January of 1992; 75 basis point
raise in November 1994 to be a 50 basis point increase in November of 1991 and a 25 basis point increase
in December of 1994; and 100 basis point cut in January 2001 to be two consecutive 50 basis point
decreases in January and February of 2001. A small upward inertia bias that might result from these
manipulations does not invalidate the conclusion that inertia has limited effects on monthly policy setting.
15
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level occur when the central bank responds to unusual economic conditions. Rudebusch
(2006) reports a list of events that the Fed seems to have responded to beyond its reaction
to inflation and output gap. On this list are stock market crashes, disruptions in the flow
of credit, default on debt by major borrowers, and other financial crises. In fact, several
studies show that proxies for episodes of financial market distress enter significantly the
Taylor-type rules estimated for the Fed. 17 So, I add an indicator variable to the estimated
model to account for the monetary response to severe financial difficulty, the so-called
credit crunches. 18
The Fed’s monetary policy is thought to have changed significantly over time, and a
common way of controlling for the stability of coefficients in estimated rules is to divide
long samples with respect to changes in the Fed chairmanship. 19 To account for a
possible shift between Greenspan and Bernanke regimes, I add to the model a second
indicator that equals 0 for the Greenspan period (10/89-01/06) and 1 for the Bernanke
period (02/06-12/07), and the interactions between this indicator and the remaining
explanatory variables.
The maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the extended policy rule including the
interaction terms are reported in Table 1.1 in the Appendix. 20 I fail to reject the null
hypothesis that coefficients on the interaction terms are collectively zero with a Wald
statistic of 7.16 (and p-value of 0.52). This result, combined with that interaction terms
are individually insignificant, supports extending the sample through the end of 2007.
The parameter estimates for the baseline model are in the fourth column. The coefficients
are such that the central bank responds systematically to the level of inflation and the
change in the output gap. 21 These estimates are consistent with expectations and in line
with prior literature that monetary policy is carried out counter-cyclically to stabilize
prices and output. 22
17

Among them, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) presents evidence that the Fed reacts to risk premia on corporate
bonds, whereas Driffill et al. (2006) display a systematic response to interest rate futures.
18
This variable takes the value 1 for the period 07/90-10/92 (a prolonged credit crunch where households
and firms became reluctant to borrow and expend, or invest, and financial institutions to lend), 09/98-12/98
(Russian default and devaluation, Asian financial crisis), 09/01-01/02 (events of September 11, 2001),
09/07-12/07 (collapse of the housing market and resulting strain on financial markets), and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) and Gerlach-Kristen (2003) include dummy variables to control for
the European Central Bank’s reaction to intra-European exchange market pressures in the early 1990s.
19
See Hakes (1990) or Judd and Rudebusch (1998).
20
I take as given the stationarity of the data series in the extended Taylor rule. This is consistent with prior
literature. See, for example, Clarida et al. (1998), Dueker (1999), Clarida et al. (2000), Gerlach and
Schnabel (2000), Rudebusch (2002), and Gerlach-Kristen (2004), among many others.
21
If the change in the output gap is dropped from the model, output gap becomes significant. This more
closely resembles previous studies. Alternative specifications with consumer price index inflation, output
gap measured by the unemployment gap, that is, the deviation of the actual rate of unemployment from the
natural rate, and additional lags for the interest rate change yield quantitatively similar results, and so are
not reported here for brevity.
22
See Choi (1999) and Dueker (1999) for monthly, and Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida et al. (2000),
Rudebusch (2002), and English et al. (2003) for quarterly results.
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The estimates on the two lags of the dependent variable (β2 = 1.97 and β3 = 1.54) show
that funds rate changes raise the likelihood of further changes in the same direction.
However, these estimates should not be taken as documenting explosive policy because
their magnitudes, as with all other coefficients, depend on the normalization of the
standard deviation of ordered probit errors.
In testing for serial correlation, I use the generalized residuals proposed by Gourieroux et
al. (1985). I calculate the score statistics up to six lags (ξj, j = 1 … 6) under the null
hypothesis of serial independence in the ordered probit residuals. 23 These score statistics
are reported in Table 1.1. The vector of explanatory variables includes the first two lags
of the dependent variable, and so I find no serial correlation at the first two lags.
Although the score statistics increase in magnitude at higher lags, they remain
statistically insignificant lending support to the ordered probit structure.

The score statistics are asymptotic χ21 variates under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the
ordered probit residuals. In the absence of serial correlation at a given lag, they fall into the interval [0,
3.84] with 95 percent probability.
23
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4. Inertia in Funds Rate Setting
In this section, I test for inertia in the Fed’s monthly funds rate policy by measuring the
extent to which an interest rate change last month affects the policy setting this month. I
start by choosing values for the variables in the policy rule (Xt) to imitate a stable
economic environment that requires no interest rate response from the Fed. I then impose
on the system a lagged interest rate adjustment through ΔFFRt-1. The expected interest
rate change, defined as the impact of this counterfactual lagged adjustment on current
month’s policy, is used to test for inertia.
In building a stable economy, I assume that FFRt-1 = 4.42 (sample average), ΔFFRt-2 = 0,
πt-1 = 0 (in excess of the inflation target), Δπt-1 = 0, yt-1 = 0, Δyt-1 = 0, and the credit crunch
dummy takes the value 0. The chosen values pertain to a situation in which the goal
variables equal their targets, and therefore the central bank has no incentive to change the
funds rate.
An alternative scenario is built on the observation that the federal funds rate was fixed at
5.50 percent from April 1997 to August 1998 for 17 consecutive months. Here, I use the
average values of the explanatory variables for the period from July 1997 to June 1998,
the year that corresponds to the middle of this prolonged episode of policy inactivity. The
chosen values (i.e. FFRt-1 = 5.50, ΔFFRt-2 = 0, πt-1 = -0.57, Δπt-1 = 0.04, yt-1 = 0.50, Δyt-1 =
0.11, and credit crunch dummy taking the value 0) describe a situation in which the Fed
actually revealed that it did not think a change in the funds rate was warranted to attain its
objectives.
Having reproduced a stable economy, I build a counterfactual on the remaining
independent variable ΔFFRt-1. The first lag takes one of five values observed in the
sample (i.e. -0.5, -0.25, 0, 0.25, or 0.5 percentage points) one at a time. These five values
represent five possible states of the world last period.
To summarize, the parameter estimates (β) and the selected values of the explanatory
variables (Xt) are plugged into expression (1) to locate the conditional mean of desired
rate changes, μ = E[ΔFFRt*| Xt, β], on its continuous scale. Figure 1.1 in the Appendix
provides an illustration. With the ordered probit errors distributed around μ with unit
variance, the resulting probability density yields the likelihood of each response category
given the estimated thresholds. The conditional mean of observed rate changes E[ΔFFRt |
Xt, β, τ] is calculated as the weighted average rate of change for five discrete outcomes by
multiplying each (in basis points) with its predicted probability and summing over:
E[ΔFFRt] = Pr (ΔFFRt = -0.50) * (-50) + … + Pr (ΔFFRt = 0.50) * (50). I call this
conditional mean the expected funds rate change.
The expected funds rate changes for five different states of the world under the two
alternative scenarios are reported in Table 1.2. Columns two to six of the table show how
the entire probability distribution moves with changes in the state of the world. For
11

example, the first and the third entries in the second column of the upper panel (i.e. 0.054
and 0.005) show that a lagged funds rate cut of 50 basis points, compared to no lagged
adjustment, raises the probability of observing another 50 basis point cut almost 11-fold,
from 0.5 percent to 5.4 percent. Across the table, we see that lagged rate changes raise the
probability of further adjustments in the same direction, and this signals inertia.
The entries in the seventh column quantify the size of the inertia implied by shifting
probability densities. These entries are the interest rate changes (in basis points) expected
in current period t following the designated rate change in previous period t-1. For
example, the first entry in the upper panel shows that a lagged funds rate cut of 50 basis
points leads to an expected further decrease of 7.80 basis points. Taken together, funds
rate changes generate expectations of further changes in the same direction, and the size
of these expected changes increase in the size of lagged adjustments.
The standard errors for the expected rate changes are reported in the last column. All
expected changes generated by non-zero lagged adjustments are significant at 5 percent
level, except the one that follows a 25 basis point cut under the first scenario that is
significant at 10 percent level. The significance of expected rate changes implies that
interest rate adjustments lead to further non-trivial adjustments in the future. This is
evidence that inertia plays a part in the monthly setting of the federal funds rate.
As evident in expression (3), the probability of a given interest rate change category is
evaluated at the values selected for the entire Xt vector, not just ΔFFRt-1. Therefore, the
magnitudes of expected rate changes reported in Table 1.2 depend not just on the first lag
of the funds rate change but also on values chosen for other conditioning variables. To
demonstrate how sensitive the expected rate changes are to small perturbations in other
conditioning variables, I report in Table 1.3 the expected changes that would result from
a lagged funds rate cut of 50 basis points along with a one-tenth standard deviation
change (increase and decrease) in other conditioning variables.
The entry in the second row of the eight column (i.e. -10.58) shows that, when the lagged
federal funds rate (i.e. FFRt-1) is raised by one-tenth of a standard deviation in the
calibration exercise, a lagged funds rate cut of 50 basis points leads to a further decrease
of 10.58 basis points. This is very close to -10.34 reported for the baseline setting. The
standard error of this prediction (i.e. 4.28) shows that it is statistically significant. Across
the table, we see that although small perturbations to other conditioning variables affect
the quantitative results slightly, qualitative predictions of the model remain unchanged. 24
The contribution of inertia to the observed persistence in funds rate changes can be
examined by testing whether the expected rate changes (ERCs) reported in Table 1.2 are
sufficient to generate further discrete adjustments. The null hypotheses that the expected
rate changes are not significantly different from 25 (or -25) basis points, the smallest
24

The results for the remaining explanatory variables and for the other four states of the world are
consistent with those reported in Table 3.
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adjustment observed in the sample, are tested for four different states of the world last
period, k = 1, 2, 4, and 5. The test scores for the two alternative scenarios are reported in
Table 1.4. We see across the board that although expected funds rate changes are
significant in size, they are never large enough to create further discrete adjustments, of
even the smallest size. Therefore, inertia-driven persistence can be rejected at all
conventional significance levels for all states of the world under both scenarios.
This finding has the implication that inertia plays only a limited role in generating the
observed path of persistent interest rate changes. Then, a large part of such persistence
must arise from the Fed’s reaction to serially correlated factors omitted in policy rules.
This conclusion parallels the view that inertia and serially correlated shocks jointly
influence the Fed’s policy.
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5. Conclusions
In this study, I examine the observed persistent nature of monetary policy adjustment
using an ordered probit model. The evidence shows that inertia exists in the Fed’s
monthly funds rate setting, but not to the extent that it could lead to consecutive interest
rate changes. This finding suggests that the Fed’s reaction to serially correlated factors
plays an important role in policy setting.
For future research, alternative calibration values in the probit equation will help examine
more deeply how the funds rate responds to varying states of the economy. Also,
applications of the ordered probit-based exercise to other interest rate instruments and
goal variables will reveal more about the Fed’s monetary policy.
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Table 1.1 Ordered probit estimation results for monthly target funds rate changes

Description
Rule Arguments
FFRt-1
ΔFFRt-1
ΔFFRt-2
πt-1
Δπt-1
yt-1
Δyt-1
Credit Crunch Dummy
Interactions
D1 (FFRt-1)
D2 (ΔFFRt-1)
D3 (ΔFFRt-2)
D4 (πt-1)
D5 (Δπt-1)
D6 (yt-1)
D7 (Δyt-1)
D8 (Credit Crunch)
Thresholds1
τ1 between-0.5 and -0.25
τ2 between -0.25 and 0
τ 3 between 0 and 0.25
τ 4 between 0.25 and 0.5
Autocorrelation Score
Statistics
ξ 1 (p-value)
ξ 2 (p-value)
ξ 3 (p-value)
ξ 4 (p-value)
ξ 5 (p-value)
ξ 6 (p-value)
Wald χ2 (16/8)
Prob > χ2(16/8)
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2
Sample Size

Extended Rule

Standard Error

Baseline Rule

Standard Error

-0.11
2.13
1.57
0.18
-0.08
-0.00
0.58
-1.22

0.06
0.58
0.58
0.9
0.07
0.11
0.20
0.30

-0.10
1.97
1.54
0.21
-0.09
-0.03
0.49
-1.32

0.05
0.67
0.53
0.82
0.08
0.24
0.17
0.21

0.02
-3.00
-0.75
0.59
-0.35
0.16
-1.29
-1.74

0.09
2.15
2.20
0.47
0.36
0.84
1.01
1.60

-3.15
-2.10
0.77
1.88

0.36
0.32
0.27
0.31

-3.05
-2.05
0.77
1.87

0.27
0.41
0.19
0.28

0.09 (0.76)
0.27 (0.60)
2.77 (0.10)
2.08 (0.15)
0.64 (0.42)
2.31 (0.13)
122.64
0.00
-163.66
0.27
218

0.16 (0.69)
0.35 (0.55)
3.46 (0.06)
1.13 (0.29)
1.10 (0.29)
2.20 (0.14)
115.34
0.00
-167.31
0.26
218

In the extended rule, if ∆FFRt* is less than -3.15 ∆FFRt is -0.50; if ∆FFRt* is between -3.15 and -2.10
∆FFRt is -0.25; and so on.
1
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Table 1.2 Expected funds rate changes

First
Scenario
Δ FFRt-1 = - 50
Δ FFRt-1 = - 25
Δ FFRt-1 = 0
Δ FFRt-1 = 25
Δ FFRt-1 = 50
Alternative
Scenario
Δ FFRt-1 = - 50
Δ FFRt-1 = - 25
Δ FFRt-1 = 0
Δ FFRt-1 = 25
Δ FFRt-1 = 50

Pr(-50)

Pr(-25)

Pr(0)

Pr(25)

Pr(50)

Expected Rate
Change
(Standard Error)

p-value

0.054
0.018
0.005
0.001
0.001

0.219
0.118
0.051
0.018
0.005

0.714
0.821
0.834
0.749
0.589

0.013
0.041
0.100
0.199
0.315

0.001
0.002
0.010
0.034
0.091

-7.80 (3.58)
-2.71 (1.62)
1.50 (0.85)
6.15 (1.74)
12.27 (3.97)

0.03
0.09
0.08
0.00
0.00

0.079
0.028
0.008
0.002
0.001

0.263
0.156
0.073
0.028
0.008

0.650
0.788
0.841
0.794
0.660

0.008
0.026
0.072
0.155
0.269

0.001
0.001
0.006
0.021
0.062

-10.34 (4.21)
-4.60 (2.06)
-0.18 (1.20)
4.13 (1.84)
9.58 (3.82)

0.01
0.03
0.88
0.03
0.01

Expected interest rate changes are expressed in basis points. I use the Delta method in computing standard
errors and p-values for expected rate changes, which uses the variance-covariance matrix from the ordered
probit estimation of the baseline model.
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Table 1.3 Sensitivity analysis for expected funds rate changes
Lagged
Adjustment

Controlled
Variable

Pr(-50)

Pr(-25)

Pr(0)

Pr(25)

Pr(50)

Expected
Rate
Change
-10.34

Standard
Error

Δ FFRt-1 = - 50

Baseline

0.079

0.263

0.650

0.008

0.001

Δ FFRt-1 = - 50
Δ FFRt-1 = - 50

+ σ/10 FFRt-1
- σ/10 FFRt-1

0.082
0.076

0.267
0.258

0.643
0.657

0.007
0.008

0.000
0.000

-10.58
-10.05

4.28
4.15

Δ FFRt-1 = - 50
Δ FFRt-1 = - 50

+ σ/10 πt-1
- σ/10 πt-1

0.075
0.084

0.256
0.269

0.661
0.640

0.008
0.007

0.000
0.000

-9.91
-10.73

4.12
4.32

Δ FFRt-1 = - 50
Δ FFRt-1 = - 50

+ σ/10 Δyt-1
- σ/10 Δyt-1

0.076
0.083

0.257
0.268

0.658
0.642

0.008
0.007

0.000
0.000

-9.99
-10.64

4.18
4.24

4.21
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Table 1.4 Hypothesis tests for inertia-driven persistence
Null Hypothesis
First
Scenario
ERCΔFFRt-1 = -50 (= -7.80) = -25
ERCΔFFRt-1 = -25 (= -2.71) = -25
ERCΔFFRt-1 = 25 (= 6.15) = 25
ERCΔFFRt-1 = 50 (= 12.27) = 25
Alternative
Scenario
ERCΔFFRt-1 = -50 (= -10.34) = -25
ERCΔFFRt-1 = -25 (= -4.60) = -25
ERCΔFFRt-1 = 25 (= 4.13) = 25
ERCΔFFRt-1 = 50 (= 9.58) = 25

t-statistic

p-value

4.80
13.75
-10.86
-3.21

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

9.41
9.89
-11.34
-10.57

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Density

-∞

τ1

τ2

μ 0

τ3

τ4

+∞

Figure 1.1 Predicted probabilities for interest rate change categories. These probabilities are determined by
where μ = E [∆FFRt* | Xt, β] lies on its continuous scale in relation to the estimated thresholds (τk, for k = 0
… 5) given τ0 = -∞ and τ5 = +∞. The standard normal density function is received by setting the standard
deviation of ordered probit errors around μ equal to one. The area of the region beneath the density to the
left of τ1 gives the probability of a half percentage point cut in the federal funds rate, and so on.
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Part 2
Temporal Aggregation and Monetary Policy Inertia
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Abstract
A common feature of empirical monetary policy reaction functions is a large estimated
coefficient for the lagged interest rate, which many interpret as partial adjustment or
inertia. Recently, the partial adjustment hypothesis has come under criticism. It is argued
that the estimated size of inertia is upward biased due to model misspecification or the
use weak instruments in forward-looking policy rules. In this paper, I present evidence
that the temporal aggregation of interest rates contributes to the upward inertia bias.
Particularly, measuring the path of monetary policy by averaged interest rates leads to
spuriously large partial adjustment coefficients due to temporal aggregation effects.

26

1. Introduction
Monetary policy reaction functions feature a large estimated coefficient for the lagged
interest rate, which is often interpreted as partial adjustment, or inertia, by central
banks. 25 This finding is difficult to reconcile with the alternative term structure evidence
of low predictability in future interest rate changes. 26 In fact, Rudebusch (2002) argues
that partial adjustment coefficients are considerably upward biased, and that their
significance can be attributed to the central bank’s reaction to serially correlated factors
omitted in estimated policy rules. 27 Consolo and Favero (2009) present an alternative
explanation for the upward bias focusing on the quality of instruments used in forwardlooking rules estimated by the generalized method of moments. 28 In this study, I show
that the temporal aggregation of interest rates is another contributing factor. In particular,
measuring the path of monetary policy by averaged interest rates leads to spuriously large
partial adjustment coefficients due to temporal aggregation effects.
A monetary policy reaction function is an empirical relationship that determines how
strongly policymakers respond to economic conditions. Following Taylor (1993), it is
common to include a short-term interest rate as the dependent variable and a few leading
indicators (i.e. inflation and output gap) as explanatory variables. Often, a lagged interest
rate is added to account for the dynamic nature of policy adjustment. The sampling
frequency of the data on indicator variables is assumed to match the decision-making
frequency of the monetary authority, which leads to the use of a temporally aggregated
interest rate series. Temporal aggregation here refers to either point-in-time sampling (i.e.
last day of the period interest rates) or averaging (i.e. daily interest rates averaged over
each period). Although temporal aggregation is necessary for estimating the policy rule,
no prior study examines its effect on the predicted speed of monetary policy adjustment.
It is well established in the literature that temporal aggregation alters the time-series
properties of the data. 29 Theoretically, aggregating a data generating process over time
affects not only the order of its ARMA representation but also the size of its parameters.
Importantly, the effect of point-in-time sampling is not the same as the effect of
averaging. Consequently, it is not surprising that a sampled sub-series exhibits different
25

Estimates on quarterly data are around 0.8 for the U.S. suggesting that only 20 percent of a desired
interest rate adjustment is achieved after a full quarter, and about 60 percent after a year. See Clarida et al.
(2000) and Sack and Wieland (2000).
26
The alternative view is that large partial adjustment coefficients should make interest rate changes at
horizons of longer than a quarter highly predictable, but the term structure evidence built on forward and
futures rates shows otherwise. See Rudebusch (2002), Rudebusch (2006), and Rudebusch and Wu (2008).
27
These omitted factors include episodes of financial market distress (Gerlach-Kristen, 2004), time
variation in the real equilibrium interest rate (Trehan and Wu, 2007), and persistent gaps between real-time
and finally revised data series (Lansing, 2002).
28
They show that using weak instruments (instruments not sufficiently correlated with the variables that
they are instrumenting) significantly inflates the partial adjustment coefficient, and that the problem can be
remedied by estimating a reverse regression in which the expected inflation is the dependent variable.
29
The important contributions to this line of research are Working (1960), Telser (1967), Tiao (1972), Wei
(1981), Weiss (1984), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1987), and Rossana and Seater (1995) among others.
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time-series properties than its averaged counterpart, including its degree of serial
persistence.
This has direct implications for monetary policy reaction functions that are often based
on averaged interest rates. 30 Suppose that an interest rate cut of 50 basis points, say, from
5 to 4.5 percent, in the middle of a quarter produces an averaged interest rate series of 5,
4.75, and 4.5 percent in three consecutive quarters. If the dependent variable is the
interest rate change over the past quarter, then the 50 basis point cut is coded as two
separate 25 basis point cuts in two successive quarters adding extra persistence to the
averaged interest rate series. The extra persistence is spurious since it is an artifact of
averaging.
This study investigates the empirical significance of this spurious persistence for
estimated policy rules, especially as it pertains to the speed of adjustment coefficients. I
start by describing the conditions under which an averaged sub-series displays greater
serial persistence than its sampled equivalent. The former series is shown to have larger
theoretical autocorrelations at all lags than the latter provided these conditions.
I then turn to the impact of the differentiated correlation patterns in the two sub-series on
estimated reaction functions. An expected consequence of using a more highly serially
correlated dependent variable (i.e. averaged interest rates) in the monetary policy rule is
to drive up the partial adjustment coefficient. I obtain confirming results in quarterly
regressions of the Federal Reserve policy under the former chairman Alan Greenspan.
The partial adjustment coefficients are inflated in policy rules estimated with averaged
target funds rates relative to end-of-period funds rates. The upward bias, an artifact of
averaging, is significant and broadly comparable in size to the effect of omitting the
serially correlated factors of Rudebusch (2002).
The plan of this paper is as follows. The second section describes the effect of temporal
aggregation, both sampling and averaging, on the order of mixed ARMA processes. This
is followed by a comparative examination of the serial correlation patterns of sampled
and averaged sub-series. In the third section, I present empirical evidence that parallels
the conjectures developed in the preceding section. I conclude in the last section.

30

Most studies use averaged, rather than sampled, interest rates in reaction function estimations because
inflation and output figures represent the level of economic activity throughout a given period, and so
interest rates are averaged over the same period to correspond to the observations of inflation and output.
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2. Theoretical Considerations
Much work has been done to uncover the effects of temporal aggregation on the timeseries properties of the data. The general conclusion in this literature is that sampling and
averaging change both the ARMA order of a time series and the size of its parameters. I
start this section with a summary of findings regarding the aggregation effects on the
autoregressive and moving average orders of an ARMA process.
Let yt be a covariance stationary ARMA (p, q) process:
(1)
It is assumed throughout that the underlying ARMA (p, q) model operates on the time
interval 1, indexed by t, whereas temporally aggregated processes (both sampled and
averaged) are observed at interval m > 1, indexed by T.
A sub-series sampled point-in-time {ysT} is generated from the original series {yt} by
selecting the values distanced at m periods, and so ysT = ymt for m > 1, an integer
representing the sampling ratio between the original series and the temporally aggregated
sub-series. Previous literature, see Wei (1981) and Weiss (1984) for example, shows that
the sampled sub-series is an ARMA (p, p + (q - p) / m) process. The moving average
component of the sampled representation, if not an integer, is rounded down to the next
integer. Therefore, the number of the moving average lags can be p or p-1 depending on
whether q > p or q < p.
The averaged sub-series {yaT} is generated by averaging m adjacent values of {yt} and
then choosing from this aggregated series the values distanced at m periods such that the
observations from the original series do not overlap. The averaged sub-series yaT = [ymt +
ymt-1 + … + ymt-m+1] / m is shown to follow an ARMA (p, p + 1 + (q - p - 1) / m) process.
As the sampling ratio m increases, the sampled sub-series converges (for q < p) to an
ARMA (p, p-1) model, whereas the averaged sub-series to an ARMA (p, p). Accordingly,
the effect of averaging is to increase the moving average order of the sampled
representation by one. The significance of this result is that the extra moving average
term might manifest itself as additional (spurious) serial persistence in the averaged subseries. 31
2.1 Autocorrelations
In this sub-section, I turn to the impact of temporal aggregation on second moments. I
first present a short review of aggregation effects on the theoretical autocorrelation
patterns of sampled and averaged series. Then, I take the analysis one step further to
31

A similar point is made in Christiano and Eichenbaum, section 2.C.
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compare in size the autocorrelations of the sampled and the averaged series, and
determine if generalizations can be made about this relationship.
2.1.1 Sampling
Ermini (1992) provides a list of closed-form solutions for the impact of temporal
aggregation on model parameters. His table 2 presents the effect of both sampling and
averaging on unconditional autocovariances for varying values of the sampling ratio m.
In what follows, γ(t) is the autocovariance at lag t with the subscripts sy and y denoting
respectively the sampled sub-series and the original series.
Following Ermini, the autocovariances of a sub-series sampled at m equal intervals from
the original series {yt} are:
(2)
In expression (2), the autocovariance of the sampled sub-series at lag T, γsy(T), equals the
autocovariance of the original series at lag mT, γy(mT). Accordingly, the autocovariance
function of the sampled series for all m > 1 can be written as:

.
.
The autocorrelation at some lag t, ρ(t), equals the autocovariance at that lag divided by
the autocovariance at lag zero: ρ(t) = γy(t) / γy(0) for all t. Then, the autocorrelations of the
sampled sub-series follow from above:

.
.

where ρsy(0) is 1.
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2.1.2 Averaging
The averaged sub-series result from averaging m consecutive observations of the original
series {yt}. With the subscripts ay and y denoting the averaged and the original processes,
we have:
(3)

Here, the autocovariance of the averaged sub-series at lag T, γay(T), equals the
autocovariance of the original series at lag mT factored by |Tm (B)|2 / m2 where B is the lag
operator such that
and
.
Expression (3) is reorganized as:
(3`)
The autocovariance function for the averaged sub-series can be written as:

.
.

Then, the autocorrelations of the averaged series are:

.
.

where, once again, for ρay(0) = 1.
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2.2 Comparative Autocorrelation Patterns
It is stated above that averaging affects the moving average order of a time-series
differently than sampling, and thus an averaged sub-series might display additional
(spurious) serial persistence compared to its sampled equivalent. I now examine the
validity of this statement by building on prior work summarized in the preceding subsection. The proposed result can be formally expressed as follows:
Proposition
If the underlying process {yt} has a convex decreasing autocovariance function, then the
averaged sub-series generated from {yt} at some sampling ratio m > 1 is more serially
persistent than the sampled sub-series generated from the same underlying process at the
same sampling ratio. That is, the averaged process has larger theoretical correlation
coefficients at all lags than the sampled process: ρay(T) > ρsy(T) for all T.
Proof
The strategy here is to compare the first-order correlation coefficient of the averaged subseries, ρay(1), to that of the sampled sub-series, ρsy(1), and then look for generalizations at
higher-order lags. So, I start by examining if ρay(1) > ρsy(1) holds for all m > 1. Explicitly:
(4)
Since the first terms in the numerator and the denominator of ρay(1) equal those in ρsy(1)
multiplied by the same factor m, the remaining terms in ρay(1) will determine whether or
not expression (4) holds.
Suppose for a moment that the decrease in the autocovariance function was linear, not
convex. This would allow us to rewrite every term in square brackets in the numerator of
the left-hand side as 2 γy(m); we would have γy(m+1) + γy(m-1) = 2γy (m) for the first term,
for instance. Then, with the actual convex decreasing autocovariance function, we have
γy(m+1) + γy(m-1) = 2 γy(m) + s1, where s1 is some positive surplus owing to convexity.
For the second term, we have γy(m+2) + γy(m-2) = 2 γy(m) + s2, and so on. For S = (m-1)
s1 + (m-2) s2 + …+ (1) sm-1 and (m-1) + (m-2) + … + 1 = m (m-1) / 2, the numerator adds
to m γy(m) + m (m-1) γy(m) + S.
In the denominator of the left-hand side, the autocovariance pairs in each square bracket
are equal since γy(t) = γy(-t) for all t. Then, we can rewrite the denominator as m γy(0) +
(m-1) [2 γy(1)] + … + (1) [2 γy(m-1)]. Replacing each square bracket in this last
expression with 2 γy(1) the denominator adds to m γy(0) + m (m-1) γy(1). This replacement
necessarily increases the numerical value of the denominator due to the decreasing
pattern in autocovariances: γy(1) > γy(t) for all t > 1. A larger denominator reduces the
ratio below ρay(1), and so the expression (4) can be rewritten as:
32

(4`)
Expression (4`) holds if the condition {γy(m) + S / m (m-1)} / γy(1) > γy(m) / γy(0) is
satisfied. It is easy to see that the required condition is always satisfied because the first
term has a larger numerator and a smaller denominator than the second: S / m (m-1) > 0
and γy(1) ≤ γy(0) respectively. 32 Subsequently, we receive ρay(1) > ρsy(1) at any sampling
ratio m.
We can replicate the analysis for higher-order lags to obtain ρay(T) > ρsy(T) for all T. At
lag 2, for instance, the condition {γy(2m) + S / m (m-1)} / γy(1) > γy(2m) / γy(0) needs to
hold, and it always does for the same reasons as above. This concludes the proof that the
averaged series is more serially persistent than the sampled series if the underlying
process has a convex decreasing autocovariance function.
■
Notice that the convex decrease in autocovariances is a sufficient condition, but not
required. 33 Ermini (1992) draws the same conclusion that the averaged process is more
serially persistent than the sampled process when the underlying model is ARMA (0, 2),
which might have a larger autocovariance at lag two than at lag one. In fact, we can
generalize Ermini’s result to any ARMA (0, q) model. Provided m > q, the sampled subseries follow an ARMA (0, 0) process, that is, white noise, whereas the averaged subseries ARMA (0, 1), necessitating non-zero serial correlation at first lag.

The autocovariance at lag zero (i.e. variance) is always positive; γy (0) = var (yt) = E (yt2) > 0. At lag one,
we have by definition γy (1) = ρy (1) γy (0). Then, γy (0) ≥ γy (1) since ρy (1) ≤ 1.
33
The proof is based on convex decreasing autocovariances because most economic time-series are highly
persistent and so display comparable autocovariance patterns.
32

33

3. Empirical Results
In this section, I illustrate the practical importance of the temporal aggregation issues
discussed above for monetary policy evaluation. Particularly, I estimate quarterly reaction
functions for the recent Federal Reserve policy using both sampled and averaged interest
rates, and then compare the size and the significance of partial adjustment coefficients. 34
The empirical reaction functions literature has grown substantially in recent years. Policy
rules estimated in level form, in which the dependent variable is the level of the interest
rate, feature large coefficients for the lagged interest rate. To some, this signals monetary
policy inertia, a deliberate effort to spread interest rate changes over time. However,
partial adjustment models estimated in the presence of serially correlated shocks are
subject to identification and multiple optima problems. 35 This translates into an
observational equivalence problem in monetary policy evaluation; it is difficult to
empirically distinguish an interest rate path produced by partial adjustment under serially
uncorrelated shocks from another produced by immediate adjustment under highly
serially correlated shocks. 36 Thus, the evidence in favor of large policy inertia derived
from level regressions is not definitive.
English et al. (2003) show that estimating the policy rule in first difference form helps
overcome the observational equivalence problem, with the interest rate change replacing
its level as the dependent variable. Below, I use the estimation strategies proposed by
English et al. 37 The selection of the Greenspan era as the sample period is due to that they
are recent enough to be relevant to present-day policymakers, and that monetary policy is
thought to have remained largely consistent throughout the period.
I begin with the two specifications commonly used in the literature: partial adjustment
and full adjustment under serially correlated shocks. In the traditional partial adjustment
model, the lagged interest rate enters and the errors are assumed to be serially
uncorrelated. The model can be written as follows:
(5)
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The theoretical findings of the preceding section and the empirical results presented in this section cover
two separate but closely related issues. In particular, the proposition from above holds true unconditionally
for temporally aggregated interest rates, whereas the following empirical results are conditioned on the
exogenous determinants of monetary policy: inflation and output gap. This strategy is preferred to simply
comparing the sample autocorrelations of the two temporally aggregated processes because sample
correlations do not account for the impact of omitted serially correlated factors on interest rate setting.
35
See Griliches (1967) and Blinder (1986). See also Rudebusch (2002) for a discussion on the implications
for monetary policy reaction functions.
36
For more on the observational equivalence problem, see Feve et al. (2007) and Carillo et al. (2007).
37
See Castelnuovo (2003) for a similar application.
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In equation (5), it is the interest rate, πt is the rate of inflation, yt is the output gap, and
is an iid error term. This structure is referred to as the partial adjustment mechanism
because the funds rate adjusts gradually to the desired Taylor-rule rate closing
percent of the gap each period.
The second specification is the full adjustment model with serially correlated shocks.
Here, the lagged interest rate is not included but we allow for serial correlation in model
errors:
(6)

In this second model, ut is the serially correlated error term and the other variables follow
from above. Equation (6) imposes no partial adjustment of the interest rate by the central
bank; each period the interest rate deviates from the Taylor-rule rate by the error term ut.
The error sequence is assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process however. 38
Accordingly, some
percent of the gap between the actual rate and the Taylor-rule
rate is closed each period.
A comparison of the two models reveals the nature of the observational equivalence
problem. In the absence of new shocks, both mechanisms close each period a fraction of
in equation (5) and
the gap between the interest rate and the Taylor-rule rate:
in equation (6). So, it is difficult to empirically determine why interest rate
changes persist over time. It might be that the central bank is partially adjusting as in
equation (5), or that serially correlated factors are shaping a fully adjusting central bank’s
decisions as in equation (6).
The two hypotheses have different implications for the response of the interest rate to
changes in the Taylor-rule rate however, and this difference can be exploited to test for
consistency with data. We can, for instance, nest the two hypotheses in the same
specification, and then estimate the nested model in first difference form. 39 The nested
model can be written as:

38

As stated above, Rudebusch (2002) interprets these errors as persistent factors that the central bank
responds to but are omitted in reaction function estimations. Examples include financial market frictions
and credit crunches, time variation in the real equilibrium interest rate or the inflation target, and
discrepancies between real-time and revised economic data.
39
Nesting is not necessary, but it is intuitively appealing because it allows for both partial adjustment and
serially correlated shocks to play a role in monetary policy. English et al. have the details of the procedure.
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(7)

In equation (7), is the partial adjustment parameter and
parameter with the model simplifying to equation (5) for
for
. 40

is the serial correlation
, and to equation (6)

I report the non-linear least squares estimates of the monetary policy rules (5) to (7) in
Table 2.1 in the Appendix. 41 The sample includes quarterly data for Greenspan period,
1987Q4 through 2005Q4. The interest rate is the daily federal funds target rate, which is
temporally aggregated in two ways: averaging over each quarter and sampling on the last
business day of each quarter. Inflation is measured by the four-quarter average change in
the personal consumption expenditures price index, excluding food and energy prices, in
excess of an inflation target of 2 percent. The output gap is based on the difference
between real GDP and potential GDP, as estimated by Congressional Budget Office.
The second column in the table reports the coefficients for the partial adjustment model
(5) estimated on quarterly average funds rate, while the third reports those for the serially
correlated shocks model (6). The estimates are consistent with prior literature. In both
models, inflation and output gap enter significantly with positive signs. 42 The parameters
of interest are those that govern the dynamic adjustment of the policy rate. Evidently,
both specifications can capture the sluggish behavior of the target funds rate, via a
significant in equation (5) and a significant in equation (6). 43
The fourth column reports the estimated coefficients for the nested model (7). The
parameters are more realistic in this richer specification. Once again, inflation and output
gap enter significantly with positive signs, and changes in inflation lead to greater than
one-for-one changes in the policy rate satisfying the so-called Taylor-rule property. 44 A
40

is

Some algebra shows that the estimated equation for the change in the interest rate
.

41

Throughout, I follow the literature in assuming that the monetary authority set the interest rate based only
on current economic conditions, and the lagged interest rate when applicable.
42
The intercept term is estimated to be around 4 throughout. This is in line with the original Taylor rule in
which the constant includes an inflation target and the real equilibrium interest rate, both of which are
assumed to be 2 percent.
43
The hypotheses that residual sequences are white noise can be rejected for both specifications at
conventional significance levels. This finding implies that one of the two mechanisms alone cannot fully
explain the dynamics of the funds rate. Moreover, the rejection of white noise residuals is a sign of
uncontrolled autocorrelation in the (dynamic) partial adjustment model (5), which leads to inconsistent
parameter estimates including λ. Nonetheless, I report these estimates to be consistent with the literature.
44
This time we cannot reject the hypothesis that errors are white noise. This is in contrast to the rejections
we had for the first two specifications, lending further support to the nested model.
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comparison with the second column shows that allowing for first-order serial correlation
in model errors reduces the partial adjustment coefficient, with falling from 0.80 to
0.72.
In the fifth column, I test for differentiated temporal aggregation effects between the
averaged and the sampled interest rates. Here, I report the estimates for the nested model
(7), but now I replace the quarterly average funds rate with the end-of-quarter funds
rate. 45 The differences in estimates reported in columns four and five are all statistically
insignificant except for the parameter of interest . 46 We see that using the end-of-quarter
funds rate reduces the estimated degree of partial adjustment further from 0.72 to 0.64.
This fall is statistically significant at 9 percent level, and similar in size to the effect of
adding first-order serially correlated errors to a pure partial adjustment model.

45

The analysis in sub-section 2.2 is meant for the levels of temporally aggregated series, while equation (7)
is estimated in first difference form. This does not affect the results because equation (7) imposes the same
partial adjustment mechanism for the level of the interest rate as equation (5), with parameter λ.
46
The data sets for the two models are dependent requiring that the covariances across the two models be
accounted for in cross-model comparisons of coefficients. Using the seemingly unrelated estimation of
Weesie (1999), I fail to reject the hypotheses that corresponding coefficients are equal across the two
models with respective p-values of 0.58 for βπ, 0.87 for βy, and 0.56 for ρ. On the contrary, the hypothesis
of equal partial adjustment coefficients is rejected with a p-value of 0.09.
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4. Conclusions
This paper shows that the use of averaged interest rates in empirical policy reaction
functions leads to an upward inertia bias due to temporal aggregation effects. An
application to federal funds target rate reveals that using the quarterly averaged interest
rates is as important in driving up the predicted size of inertia as omitting the serially
correlated determinants of monetary policy.
Temporal aggregation changes the ARMA order of a time series and the size of its
parameters. Beyond the particular aspect examined here, temporal aggregation has
greater implications for empirical reaction functions. Aggregating time-series data in
weekly, monthly, or quarterly terms might alter them in ways inconsistent with the
underlying processes, leading to false inference. More work is needed to determine
temporal aggregation’s impact not only on the speed of adjustment coefficients but also
on the general behavior of estimated systems.
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Table 2.1 Estimation results for quarterly reaction functions
Quarterly Average
Target Funds Rate

Coefficient
Equation (5)
3.68
(0.27)
2.16
(0.27)
1.09
(0.15)
0.80
(0.05)

R2
Q-stat (4)
(p-value)
Q-stat (8)
(p-value)
Sample Size

0.97
64.13
(0.00)
67.37
(0.00)
73

Equation (6)
3.84
(1.31)
0.86
(0.28)
0.34
(0.10)

End-of-quarter
Target Funds Rate

0.96
(0.03)

Equation (7)
3.85
(0.47)
1.88
(0.45)
0.89
(0.25)
0.72
(0.04)
0.70
(0.13)

Equation (7)
3.92
(0.41)
1.71
(0.40)
0.86
(0.22)
0.64
(0.03)
0.68
(0.13)

0.97
30.30
(0.00)
36.33
(0.00)
73

0.98
2.59
(0.63)
3.34
(0.91)
73

0.98
2.58
(0.63)
4.42
(0.82)
73

Equation (5) allows only for partial adjustment, equation (6) only for serially correlated errors, and
equation (7) for both mechanisms to be present. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All R2 statistics
are reported for the level of the federal funds rate to be consistent across policy rules estimated in level
form and first differences. Portmanteau Q test statistics (allowing for 4 and 8 autocorrelations respectively)
are reported to test for white noise residuals.
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Part 3
The Peculiar Economics of Housing Bubbles
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This paper has been accepted for publication in Contemporary Economic Policy.
My primary contributions to this paper include part of the literature review, development
of the theoretical model, derivation of the policy implications, and part of the writing.

Abstract
Home values increase rapidly during housing bubbles generating large capital gains. High
loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages secured by expected future home values are one way to
take advantage of these capital gains. In this paper, we use a simple partial equilibrium
consumer theory model to explore the implications of high LTV borrowing. We find that
sufficiently large expected house price growth leads to upward sloping budget lines when
households can obtain high LTV mortgages. In this environment, the demand for housing
fits neither the conventional theories of consumer goods nor that of investment goods. In
fact, increases in the expected future price of housing may reduce current housing
demand while decreases in the effective (current) price may lead to households buying
smaller homes. Moreover, high LTV loans reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy
but raise the volatility of aggregate demand. Tighter borrowing standards may help lower
demand volatility at the expense of shrinking the economy.
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1. Introduction
Housing differs from other consumption goods in important ways. Houses are extremely
durable, changing houses involves large transactions costs so that households do not
move very often, and in most cases, houses are financed through borrowing. Furthermore,
houses represent status and allow access to other benefits, such as parks, schools, or
desirable neighborhoods. Automobiles share most of these attributes, although to a lesser
extent, but housing and automobiles differ in one key feature. Automobiles, except
maybe collectibles, tend to diminish in value over time. However, during several periods
in recent history house prices have appreciated significantly, providing an investment
motive for homeownership in addition to its consumption benefits.
Home values rise rapidly during housing bubbles, generating large capital gains.
Households can take advantage of these capital gains either by selling their house or by
borrowing against its increased value, either through home equity loans or new
mortgages. If households are allowed to borrow against the current values of their homes,
it is a small step to allow them to borrow against the expected future values of their
homes, especially when both lenders and borrowers agree that house prices will keep
rising. In fact, this has been happening. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 limited the
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, that is, the fraction of the market price of a house one could
borrow, to 50 percent. By 1970, that limit had grown to 90 percent, and in 1989 it rose to
100 percent. In 1997 the LTV limit increased to 125 percent allowing the mortgage loan
to exceed the market value of the house, and these loans were aggressively marketed to
consumers. 47 The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of these high LTV
mortgage loans secured by expected future home values.
The evidence regarding high LTV loans paints a bleak picture. Haughwout et al. (2008)
report that thirty percent of subprime mortgages originated in 2006 had LTVs of at least
100 percent. These new subprime mortgages were the primary contributor to the first
increase in homeownership rates in three decades (Chambers et al, 2007). The high LTV
originations led to high foreclosure rates during the recent housing bust. In 2007, 40
percent of the foreclosures in Massachusetts had origination LTVs of at least 100 percent.
Fifteen years earlier, in contrast, fewer than 9 percent of foreclosures had such high
origination LTVs (Foote et al, 2008). Haughwout and Okah (2009) note, based on a
December 2008 sample of 43 states that exclude boom and bust states, that roughly 10
percent of homes had negative equity. They report that the average origination LTV for
the above-water homes was 83 percent, and that for below-water homes was 98 percent.
Our analysis presumes a particular type of market failure. If markets are efficient,
expected future prices are tied to current prices through the interest rate. Specifically, if
markets expect the price of an asset to be $600,000 in ten years, and the 10-year interest
rate is 50 percent (that is, 50 percent over ten years and not 50 percent per year), then the
47

High LTV borrowing often requires “piggybacking” second mortgages or home-equity loans on top of
traditional mortgages, which have 80 percent LTV limitation.
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present value of the asset is $400,000. Conversely, if the current value of the asset, say a
house, is $400,000 and the 10-year interest rate is 50 percent, the expected future price of
the house is $600,000. But, what would happen if markets forecast home prices to grow
faster than the interest rate? 48 For example, what would occur if current house prices are
$400,000 and are expected to rise to $700,000, but the corresponding long-term interest
rate is only 50 percent? This scenario could materialize if the recent house price growth
rate has exceeded the interest rate and both borrowers and lenders expect such recent
price trends to persist, thereby expecting the housing bubble to continue, not burst. 49 How
do these beliefs coupled with access to high LTV loans impact behavior today?
To answer this question, we use a partial equilibrium consumer theory model. 50
Consumers derive utility from housing and consumption, and current house prices,
expected future house prices, and the interest rate are all given. We analyze only one
period, but consumers can borrow against the expected future value of any house they
buy in that period. We find that when the house prices are predicted to rise faster than the
interest rate, and when consumers are allowed to borrow against these expectedly high
future prices, the budget line slopes upward. The logic is straightforward. A small house
leads to appreciation the consumer can borrow against. A larger house leads to greater
appreciation even if house prices grow at the same rate for small and large houses.
Therefore, buying a larger house now generates more income that the consumer can
spend now. Essentially, the consumer chooses a larger house so that she can afford to buy
more of everything else.
Other researchers have looked at the interaction of housing and consumption. Dusansky
and Wilson (1993) formulate a model in which rising current house prices lead to
expectations of further house price increases, in which case households increase their
demand for housing to take advantage of the anticipated capital gains. This leads to an
upward-sloping demand curve for housing. Dusansky and Koc (2007) treat housing as
both a consumption good and an investment vehicle, and then provide empirical evidence
that the investment role dominates the consumption role using data from Florida. 51 Our
theoretical model goes one step further than these studies, showing that not just an
upward-sloping housing demand curve, but an upward-sloping household budget line
results when the expected house price growth exceeds the interest rate and households
obtain high LTV loans to take advantage of the anticipated house price appreciation.
When the budget line slopes upward and consumers have monotonic preferences, no
optimum exists. To get a solution, we add a constraint that limits consumer borrowing to
48

Case and Shiller (2003) use survey evidence to document that home purchases in 2003 were driven in
part by an investment motive fueled by expectations of large home price appreciation.
49
Dusansky and Wilson (1993) also explore a similar scenario.
50
This contrasts with the standard life cycle/permanent income approach to housing demand introduced by
Artle and Varaiya (1978) and used more recently by Muellbauer (2008). In addition to simplifying the life
cycle model into a single period, our paper differs from these studies by explicitly allowing housing
bubbles.
51
See also Henderson and Ioannides (1985).
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a multiple of earned income. Borrowing constraints were common prior to the latest
housing bubble, and one might expect them to return. For instance, before the recent
housing bubble homebuyers could only borrow up to the point where their monthly
mortgage payment equaled 28 percent of their monthly income, and their total debt
payments equaled 36 percent of their monthly income. 52 The constraint we add to
identify a solution for the household optimization problem is a fixed relationship between
income and the amount to be borrowed, with a single parameter governing this
relationship.
Not surprisingly, the ability to borrow against overly optimistic future house prices leads
to consumers purchasing larger houses. More surprisingly, however, it leads to greater
consumption spending, too. 53 Furthermore, the model shows that housing demand fits
neither the conventional theories of consumer goods nor that of investment goods.
Particularly, increases in the expected future price of housing may reduce the current
housing demand, contrary to the typical pattern of investment goods for which rising
expected prices lead to higher current demand. Similarly, a decrease in the effective
(current) price of housing may lead to households purchasing smaller homes, contrary to
the usual pattern of consumption goods for which lower prices lead to higher quantity
demanded.
We conclude our discussion by considering issues important to policymakers: the
household response to changes in the interest rate and that to shocks in earned income.
The former matters to central bankers for whom housing provides a transmission channel
for monetary policy and the latter to those concerned with long-term economic growth.
The model shows that the ability to borrow against high house price forecasts reduces the
effectiveness of monetary policy but raises the volatility of aggregate demand.54
Tightening borrowing standards can lower such volatility and increase the marginal
propensity to save at the expense of shrinking the overall activity.
The plan of this paper is as follows. The second section sets out the structure of the model
describing the budget constraints and borrowing constraints. In the following section, we
examine the effect of rising house price forecasts. In the fourth section, we discuss the
policy implications: the effect of interest rate changes, income shocks, and lending
restrictions. We conclude in the fifth section by discussing the recent developments in the
housing market and macroeconomy in general in light of our model.

52

Aron et al. (2008a, 2008b) and Williams (2008) show how financial deregulation leads to house price
appreciation.
53
Jappelli and Pagano (1994) construct an alternative model showing how financial deregulation can lead
to declining national savings and slower economic growth.
54
Edge et al. (2008) use a DSGE model of the US economy to examine house price volatility and monetary
policy effects. They find evidence that monetary policy has had little impact on recent residential
investment trends, in line with our findings below. On a related note, Aron et al. (2008b) show that an
easing in credit conditions has led to structural shifts in the consumption-to-income ratio, breaking the preexisting co-integrations.
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2. Budget constraints and borrowing constraints
Our approach is to construct a simple model in which households can borrow against the
future values of their homes. To do this, we assume that households live for a single
period, purchasing a home at the beginning of the period and selling it at the end. They
have preferences over housing investment h and consumption spending c, with their
utility function given by
. Importantly, they do not value bequests or savings since
they do not live past the first period, and therefore they have an incentive to spend all of
their resources and leave no equity in their homes. 55
Earned income is given by y, realized at the beginning of the period. Households also
earn the appreciation from the sale of their houses at the end of the period. At the
beginning of the period, the price of a unit of housing is p0 and the price of unit
consumption is normalized to 1. These prices are exogenous in the model, as is the
forecast future price of housing, denoted by pf. Both households and lenders agree on the
value of pf, so that if a household purchases a house of size h she can borrow against its
expected future value, pf h, at the exogenously given interest rate i.
Households make all of their decisions simultaneously at the beginning of the period,
choosing consumption, housing, and borrowing. They can finance current spending either
through earned income or through borrowing against expected home equity. Current
spending is p0h + c, and the most household can spend is:
(1)
where a is the fraction of the future home value that the household borrows. Since
households cannot borrow more than the expected future value of their homes, a falls in
the unit interval.
This specification leads to immediate implications. Consider the budget constraint:
(2)
Rearranging yields:
(3)
The bracketed term, which we denote as r, is the effective price of housing, and it is
clearly smaller than the current price p0.

55

Together these assumptions make the model, in essence, static.
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While housing shares attributes with both consumption goods and investment goods,
what makes housing most different from other consumption goods is the nature of the
effective price r. At one extreme, if a = 0 so that the household does not borrow at all
against expected future home values, the effective price r is exactly the same as the
current price p0, and housing is no different from any other consumption good. But, if a =
so
1 so that household borrows fully against the future value of their house, and
that house prices are predicted to rise at the same rate as the interest rate, then the
effective price of housing is zero and housing is free. If
so that home prices are
predicted to grow faster than the interest rate and household borrows the full amount of
their expected home equity, the effective price of housing becomes negative. We explore
the implications of negative effective house prices in the next section.
Households may not be able to borrow the full expected future sales value of their homes,
however, perhaps because lenders are subject to regulations that relate the loan size to
earned income. To account for this, we impose the borrowing constraint:
(4)
where b represents an upper limit on the fraction of earned income that a household can
borrow. Substituting (4) into (1) yields another budget constraint:
(5)
This is the budget constraint that would hold if the household could acquire an unsecured
loan of b times her income y. However, households cannot get unsecured loans, and the
ability to borrow by requires purchasing a house of sufficient expected future value to
warrant the loan.
Figure 3.1 in the Appendix shows how the household’s budget constraint works. Housing
is measured on the horizontal axis and other consumption is measured on the vertical
axis. The figure contains three lines. The line AB is the budget line that would hold if the
household did not borrow at all against the future value of her home, that is, if a = 0. This
is the budget line that is usually considered in consumer theory, and its slope is –p0. We
will refer to it as the “original” budget line. The line AC is the budget line that obtains
when the household borrows fully against the future value of her home, so that a = 1.
Borrowing reduces the effective price of housing, thereby making the budget line flatter
with a slope
instead of –p0 as with budget line AB. Evidently, this allows the
household to purchase more of both housing and consumption. The remaining line ED is
the budget line that would hold if the household could obtain an unsecured loan of by and
spend it in any way desired. This budget constraint corresponds to expression (5), and it
is referred to as the “outer” budget line. Since both expressions (2) and (5) must hold, the
actual budget constraint facing the household is the curve AFD.
50

It is worthwhile to see how the household moves along this curve from point A to point
F, and then from F to D. Begin at point A. At this point, the household spends her entire
income on consumption and has no housing to borrow against. So, she does not borrow.
If she purchases some amount of housing, though, she gains the ability to borrow against
its expected future value. For an effective price of housing r, the household moves along
the budget line AC toward point F, purchasing larger houses and borrowing the full
discounted expected future value of those houses. When the household reaches point F,
however, she has hit the borrowing constraint for a total loan size of by, and no bank will
lend her any more than that amount. This does not mean that the household cannot buy a
larger house though, it only means that she cannot borrow more than by against that
larger house. Since the household cannot borrow against the future value of the additional
housing units, the price of additional housing returns to the current price p0 instead of the
effective price r, and as the household purchases larger and larger houses she moves
along the outer budget line from point F to point D. 56

56

The point F represents a situation in which the household borrows the maximum amount by that also
corresponds to the full discounted expected future value of a house of the size by(1+i)/pf.
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3. The effects of rising house price forecasts
A key feature of a housing bubble is that markets expect house prices to rise rapidly. If
households have access to high LTV loans secured by this expected appreciation, house
price forecasts affect the household’s current choices of what homes to buy and how
much to consume. Figure 3.2 illustrates these issues. First suppose that pf = 0, so that
households cannot borrow because their homes will fully depreciate and have no value in
the future. They are constrained to the original budget line. They solve the usual utility
maximization problem and choose point A in the figure. Note that this is the budget
constraint that would hold if housing were an ordinary consumption good.
Housing is not an ordinary consumption good, however, because home values do not
fully depreciate during an individual’s lifetime and homeowners can sell their houses at
any time. Furthermore, homeowners may borrow against the forecast future value of their
houses, especially when both borrowers and lenders agree on these forecasts. When the
forecast future price of housing pf rises, the budget line rotates outward because the
effective price of housing r falls. Note that the intersection of the budget constraint with
the vertical axis remains fixed at y, because when households spend all of their income on
consumption and none on housing they have nothing to borrow against.
As the forecast price of housing rises and the budget line rotates outward, the household’s
spending opportunities increase. When the forecast future price reaches the point where
so that expected growth in house prices matches the interest rate, housing
becomes essentially free because the discounted expected future sales price equals the
current purchase price. At this point the budget line becomes horizontal, consistent with
an effective price of zero. If house price forecasts rise even further the effective house
price becomes negative and the budget line actually slopes upward, meaning that by
purchasing larger homes households can purchase more of other consumption goods. 57
The bold dashed curve in Figure 3.2 is the household’s expansion path, showing the
optimal housing-consumption pairs for different values of the forecast future price of
housing. The expansion path begins at point A on the household’s original budget line,
which holds when the forecast price is zero and households are unable to borrow. As the
forecast price rises and the budget line rotates outward, the household increases both the
housing investment and consumption spending. Eventually pf rises to the level where the
household’s borrowing constraint binds, which is point B in the figure. Further increases
in the expected future price of housing mean that the household does not need as many
housing units to secure the maximum loan by, and so she begins downsizing. The
downsizing continues until the household reaches point C, which is her utilitymaximizing point along the outer budget line. At this point, the household no longer finds
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It is possible to modify the model to account for physical depreciation of houses, but that is ignored here
in an effort to simplify the model.
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it worthwhile to give up housing in favor of increased consumption. Therefore, further
increases in the forecast price of housing do not lead to a behavioral response.
Looked at differently, the expansion path shows how the economy behaves as the
housing bubble, defined for our purposes as a sustained increase in house price forecasts,
continues to grow. Initially, both consumption and housing demand increase as
households purchase larger homes to finance their consumption expenditures. Eventually,
households reach a point (shown by B in the figure) at which their borrowing is
constrained by their income, and further forecast price increases lead to greater demand
for consumption but lower demand for housing. At some point (C in the figure) this trend
ends, and further increases in the forecast house prices have no economic impact.
Importantly, the analysis identifies three different regions on the expansion path for the
effect of forecast prices on household behavior. In the first region, corresponding to
relatively low forecast home prices, both consumption and housing demand increase with
forecast prices. In this region, housing acts like an ordinary investment vehicle, with
rising expected future prices leading to higher demand. In a second region, corresponding
to a middle range of forecast home prices, consumption rises but housing demand falls
with forecast prices. This contradicts the typical behavior of an investment vehicle for
which demand rises when expected future prices increase. Housing also differs from an
ordinary consumption good in this second region, because its demand falls even though
the (current) effective price decreases. In the third region, corresponding to high forecast
home prices, further price increases have no effect on household spending.
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4. The interest rate, saving rates, and volatility
The preceding section showed how the household’s ability to take out high LTV
mortgage loans secured by forecast home values leads to unusual purchasing patterns that
fit neither investment nor consumption models. These patterns are only important,
however, if they influence the way in which policy is formulated and carried out. This
section explores the implications of the model for interest rate changes, household saving
rates, economic volatility, and borrowing restrictions.
The effectiveness of monetary policy rests on its ability to promote changes in household
spending. Within our model, monetary policy impacts the household through its effect on
the interest rate. An examination of expression (2) shows that interest rate changes work
in exactly the same manner, but in the opposite direction, as changes in the expected
future price of housing, and these changes were depicted in Figure 3.2. Both interest rate
decreases and forecast future house price increases lead to counter-clockwise movements
along the expansion path. Unless the interest rate falls so low that households reach point
C in Figure 2, monetary policy alters household behavior.
What matters for the economy, however, is not so much whether households modify their
bundles of housing and consumption, but whether they change the total amount they
spend on housing and consumption combined. In Figure 3.2, every bundle on the outer
budget line, and in particular between B and C, costs exactly the same amount, (1+b)y.
More importantly, this amount is completely independent of the interest rate, and so is
unaffected by monetary policy. When forecast future house prices are sufficiently high or
the interest rate is sufficiently low that consumers borrow all the way up to their
borrowing constraints, monetary policy influences the composition of household
spending, but not the total amount. Particularly, a monetary loosening leads households
to consume less housing and more consumption goods, and a monetary tightening does
the opposite. The directions of changes are noteworthy though. Falling interest rates
reduce the demand for housing, not raise it, contrary to the monetary transmission
mechanism as it was previously understood. 58 Monetary tightening, perversely, leads to
greater housing demand.
Much has been made about the downward trend in the U.S. personal saving rates over the
past two decades. 59 In explaining this downward trend in household savings, an essential
step is to have low household marginal saving propensities. In our model, when
households borrow against high forecast home values, the marginal propensity to save
can become negative. To see how, suppose that future house prices are predicted to be
58

Traditionally, there are at least six transmission channels through which interest rate changes impact the
residential investment, thus the overall economic activity. These channels include direct interest rate effects
on the (1) user cost of capital, (2) expectations of future home values, and (3) housing supply, in addition to
indirect (4) permanent (life-cycle) wealth effects, (5) temporary balance sheet/credit channel effects on
consumer spending, and (6) temporary balance sheet/credit channel effects on housing demand. See
Mishkin (2007) for an extensive discussion of the role of housing in the monetary transmission mechanism.
59
For recent reviews of this literature, see Garner (2006) and Guidolin and La Jeunesse (2007).

54

sufficiently large such that households reach their borrowing constraints, and therefore
consume between points B and C in Figure 3.2. Now, consider the impact of a positive
income shock. An increase in earned income of Δy shifts outward both the original
budget constraint and the outer budget constraint; the original budget constraint shifts
upward by the amount Δy whereas the outer budget constraint shifts upward more, by
(1+b)Δy. Accordingly, an income increase of the size Δy leads to a total increase in
spending of (1+b)Δy. The marginal propensity to spend, then, is 1+b, which is greater
than one, and the marginal propensity to save is –b which is less than zero.
A final concern for policymakers is the volatility of economic activity. Figure 3.3
examines this issue through shocks to household’s earned income y, in two different
scenarios. In the first scenario, households cannot borrow against future home values, and
so must consume on their original budget constraint. The optimal point is A. An increase
in earned income of Δy shifts this budget constraint upward by Δy, and the new
consumption point is B. The distance between points A and B can be thought of as a
rough measure of the volatility in aggregate demand.
In the second scenario, households borrow against future home values and home price
forecasts are sufficiently high to make the effective price of housing negative. Prior to the
income shock, households choose to consume at the kink in the budget constraint, which
is at point C. An earned income shock of the same size Δy shifts the outer budget line
upward by (1+b)Δy, which is a larger shift than in the first scenario. The new
consumption point is D, at the kink of the outermost budget constraint. The distance
between points C and D is greater than the distance between A and B, reflecting that
aggregate demand would display increased variance if households were to engage in high
LTV borrowing against forecast home values.
Since the effect of any income shock Δy on total demand is magnified by a factor of 1+b
where b is the multiple of earned income households can borrow, regulating b represents
a way to reduce demand variability. In particular, reductions in b lead to smaller
adjustments in aggregate demand following an income shock, therefore a less volatile
economy. Also, more restricted borrowing will help slow down the decline in household
savings. The benefits associated with limitations on household borrowing come at a cost,
however, since a smaller b also means lower levels of household spending. In particular,
reductions in b move the outer budget line closer to the original budget line leading in
general to a contraction in overall activity.
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5. Conclusions
This paper examines the implications of high LTV mortgage borrowing for aggregate
demand volatility and policy effectiveness. We find that households that obtain high LTV
loans secured by expected high future home values purchase larger homes in order to
finance other consumption spending, and that housing demand does not fit traditional
consumption or investment theories. Rapidly rising home price forecasts can lead to
interest rate policy having no impact on aggregate spending but only causing changes in
the mixture of housing and consumption. Furthermore, high house price forecasts can
generate negative marginal propensities to save and more volatile aggregate demand
conditions. Restricting the household’s ability to borrow can help reduce economic
volatility and lead to higher marginal saving propensities at the expense of a smaller
economy.
The proposed economic structure sheds light on the recent U.S. experience of a burst
housing bubble and the resulting adverse macro consequences. In our model, rapidly
falling home price forecasts increase the effective price of housing, moving the economy
clockwise along the expansion path in Figure 3.2. In the upper part of the expansion path
(that is, above point B) falling price forecasts have no impact on the overall activity;
households stay on the outer budget line and the aggregate household spending remains
fixed at (1+b)y. Below point B, however, further declines in expected home prices leads
to households reducing the demand for housing. Because consumption is partly financed
by purchasing large houses and borrowing against them, the decline in housing demand
lowers consumption demand also. This is when the signs of recession appear with the
aggregate household spending falling below (1+b)y.
Furthermore, changes in the economic climate in a post-bubble world may lead financial
institutions to curb lending. 60 More restricted borrowing, reflected by an inward shift of
the outer budget line, puts another contractionary force on the economy leading to
aggregate demand declining at a faster pace than otherwise. Although policymakers
respond by cutting the interest rate to support the housing demand, monetary stimulus
falls short of promoting full recovery. This is because falling interest rates fail to
overcome the adverse effect of the steep decline in house price forecasts, as evident in
expression (3).
Our findings that house price forecasts affect macro outcomes in important ways ranging
from increased aggregate demand volatility to policy ineffectiveness warrant a renewed
interest in the optimal policy response to asset price bubbles. The traditional view that
changes in asset prices, except their predictable impact on future inflation and output,
should not be a concern for monetary policy needs to be justified in light of recent
developments.

60

The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has already called for lowering LTV limits; see Gunther (2009).
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Figure 3.3 Economic volatility and borrowing restrictions
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, I examine several issues regarding the conduct and the effectiveness
of monetary policy. The observed monetary behavior is a preference for successive and
relatively small interest rate changes. This persistence in interest rate changes is
documented by empirical monetary policy reaction functions that feature a large
estimated coefficient for the lagged interest rate. The two hypotheses that explain the size
of this large estimated coefficient are monetary policy inertia and serially correlated
macro shocks.
In the first part of my dissertation, I examine the persistent nature of monetary policy
adjustment using an ordered probit model. The evidence shows that inertia exists in the
Fed’s monthly funds rate setting, but not to the extent that it could lead to consecutive
interest rate changes. This finding suggests that the Fed’s reaction to serially correlated
factors plays an important role in policy setting, which is in line with the interpretation
that inertia and serially correlated shocks simultaneously affect monetary policy.
In the second part of my dissertation, I show that using averaged interest rates in
empirical policy reaction functions leads to an upward bias on the predicted size of inertia
due to temporal aggregation effects. An application to federal funds target rate reveals
that using the quarterly averaged interest rates, compared to end-of-quarter interest rates,
significantly inflates the estimated size of inertia.
The third part of my dissertation is inspired by recent developments in the housing
market and the resulting effect on the overall economy. This third essay examines the
implications of high loan-to-value mortgage borrowing for aggregate demand and
monetary policy effectiveness. We find that households with access to high loan-to-value
mortgages purchase larger homes in order to finance other consumption spending, and
that housing demand does not fit traditional consumption and investment theories.
Furthermore, rapidly rising home price forecasts lead to interest rate policy having no
impact on aggregate spending but only causing changes in the mixture of housing and
consumption.
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